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NOTES
POLLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE
BASINS: THE 1975 PHILIP C. JESSUP MOOT COURT
COMPETITION
It is a generally accepted principle that a state does not have
the right to exercise absolute sovereignty over internal or shared
waters which comprise part of an international drainage basin.
It is equally well accepted, however, that a state has the right
to some use of such waterways, but the extent of this right
remains unresolved. The 1975 Jessup Problem presents a proto-
type case for exploring the traditional and emerging law of inter-
national drainage basins. These memorials present a practical
application of the various theories of water utilization and, in
particular, of their relation to an environmental dispute be-
tween a developed and a developing state. *
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Upper Peace River rises in the State of Karma and is
wholly within Karma until it flows into the International Lake
which is twenty miles long and ten miles wide at its broadest
reach. The State of New Helios borders on the entire northern
shore of International Lake and the State of Karma on its entire
southern shore. The capital of New Helios is at the mouth of the
Lower Peace River. International Lake empties into the Lower
Peace River which continues to form the boundary between
Karma and New Helios. It then wholly enters Karma again until
it empties into the Ocean.
Both Karma, a developing and primarily agricultural state,
and New Helios, a developed industrialized nation enjoying a
high standard of living, are members of the United Nations. The
only bilateral agreement between the parties concerning these
waters is the 1923 Treaty of Amity, Friendship and Economic
Cooperation.'
* The memorials were submitted to the Jessup Competition by the Brooklyn Law
School participants and were awarded the Eastern Regional prize for best memorial. The
introductory sections have been modified and combined; the arguments have been reprod-
uced in their entirety.
1. The following are relevant Articles of the 1923 Treaty of Amity, Friendship and
Economic Cooperation [hereinafter cited as 1923 Treaty].
Article I
In order to carry out the purposes and objectives of this Agreement, the States
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The construction in 1955 of a tunnel-roadway first made
commercial logging feasible in Karma's Wilderness Region, lo-
cated on the Upper Peace River. In 1965 a large, privately owned
pulp and paper mill was opened upon the recommendation of the
World Development Authority (WDA), an intergovernmental
organization. The WDA also recommended the construction of
facilities for treatment of wastes from the mill and of sewage from
the shantytown of 20,000, where mill workers and their families
live. Because of the huge expense involved, the mill company has
not built these facilities, and the wastes and sewage are dis-
charged into the Upper Peace River untreated. The waters of
International Lake, from which the Capital of New Helios has for
many years drawn its drinking water, have been rendered un-
desirable for human potation and its beaches were closed in 1970
when an increase in typhoid was reported. Both New Helios and
the Lower Peace Brewery, one of its more successful industries
which has relied on the waters for thirty years, have already in-
stalled sophisticated water purification facilities at considerable
of Karma and New Helios agree to cooperate and consult with one another as
appropriate on matters of mutual interest.
Article 1
Paragraph 1. Both States agree that in keeping with the general aim of amity,
friendship and economic cooperation, neither State shall pollute boundary
waters or other waters running between them so as to injure the health or
property in the other State.
Paragraph 2. In furtherance of this responsibility the parties undertake to
enter into specific arrangements as appropriate.
Article Ell
The Lower Peace River shall be open to the ships of both States, and navigation
shall not be impeded or unreasonable conditions placed thereon, unless a situa-
tion arises in which either State, upon notification to the other, believes that
health and safety require the imposition of such conditions.
Article 1V
Paragraph 1. Disputes between the two States shall be settled amicably and
equitably with full regard to the purposes and principles set forth in this Agree-
ment.
Paragraph 2. Upon the request of either State, both States agree that ques-
tions arising under this Agreement which have not been settled within a reason-
able time may be brought to arbitration, each State choosing one arbitrator and
the remaining arbitrator to be agreed between them or, if agreement is not
reached within a period of six months from the date of the selection of the two
other arbitrators, such third arbitrator shall be selected by the President of the
Permanent Court of International Justice.
Paragraph 3. At the time a request for arbitration is made, or at any time
before the arbitration commences, either State may request that the dispute be
submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice or to a special cham-
ber of that Court. The agreement of the other State shall first be obtained before
submission is made to the Court.
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costs. If no remedial actions are taken, New Helios will be forced
to further purify the waters of the lake at a documented cost of
$2,000,000, and the brewery may be forced to seek a new source
of water at an increased cost.
In 1970, without notification to New Helios, Karma began
construction of a several-hundred-megawatt nuclear power plant
at the mouth of the Lower Peace River. The utility is a state-
owned corporation with its equipment and fuel supplied by a
third nation under strict international safeguards. In May of 1974
the plant was placed in operation at 10% of its total capacity,
emptying its cooling waters back into the Lower Peace River. The
plant was constructed to meet the growing energy demands of the
capital of Karma, located fifty miles south of International Lake.
When the construction of the nuclear plant first commenced,
protests were lodged with the government of New Helios by citi-
zens fearing the ruin of recreational uses of the Lower Peace River
and by the management of the Lower Peace Brewery, which re-
quires clear, cool waters in the production of beer. If the plant is
permitted to become fully operational, the Brewery will be forced
to install cooling lagoons at a documented cost of $900,000 or to
find a new source of water.
New Helios' protests against the location and construction of
the plant have met with curt statements that Karma has the
sovereign right to work for the development of its nation in any
way possible. In July of 1974 New Helios submitted a formal
protest to Karma requesting that the dumping of wastes and
sewage from the paper mill and shantytown and the operation of
the nuclear plant be halted immediately. The ensuing diplomatic
exchange was unfruitful, and citizens groups in New Helios are
threatening a boycott of all goods produced in Karma. Business-
men in Karma have urged their legislature to ban the sale of
Lower Peace Beer.
New Helios and Karma agreed to submit the dispute to a
chamber of the International Court of Justice, pursuant to Article
IV, para. 3, of the 1923 Treaty. The states waive the defenses of
sovereign immunity and local remedies and stipulate that the
1923 Treaty is the only bilateral agreement binding on them.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Whether Karma is responsible under the 1923 Treaty of
Amity, Friendship and Economic Cooperation for the harm which
has been or may be inflicted upon the environment of New Helios.
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II. Whether Karma is responsible under general principles of
international law for the harm which has been or may be inflicted
upon the environment of New Helios.
I. Whether any relief should be available to New Helios.
MEMORIAL FOR NEW HELIOS
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Karma's polluting uses of the international drainage basin
composed of the Upper and Lower Peace Rivers and International
Lake are causing substantial harm to New Helios and its nation-
als. Such uses are violative of Karma's obligations under the 1923
Treaty of Amity, Friendship and Economic Cooperation and
under well-recognized principles of international law. Karma is
not absolved of liability simply by virtue of being a developing
state. New Helios is entitled to injunctive relief to prevent future
harm and also to monetary damages to compensate for past and
future injuries.
ARGUMENT
I. Karma is violating both the letter and the spirit of the 1923
Treaty of Amity, Friendship and Economic Cooperation through
its use of the Upper and Lower Peace Rivers and the International
Lake.
The 1923 Treaty of Amity, Friendship and Economic Cooper-
ation was designed to compel the non-polluting use of the bound-
ary waters between New Helios and Karma.2 The continued and
expanded dumping of harmful industrial waste, raw sewage and
cooling waters is a polluting use of the boundary waters and vio-
lates both the specific language and intent of the 1923 Treaty.
There has been no disavowal by Karma of the well-recognized
principle that parties to a treaty are bound by it.3 As the only
pertinent bilateral agreement in force between New Helios and
Karma, the 1923 Treaty has a special place in determining the
legal obligations between the two nations.
It is a well-respected principle of international law that
treaty provisions should be interpreted in light of their ordinary
2. 1923 Treaty, Art. II.
3. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Art. 26, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27 [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. See also C. HYDE, 2
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1454 (1945).
1975]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
and natural meaning as well as in the context in which they
occur.' The ordinary and natural meaning of the language of
Article II is clear: "[N]either State shall pollute boundary wa-
ters or other waters running between them so as to injure the
health or property in the other State."
Karma's actions have clearly altered the quality of the river
and lake waters it shares with New Helios to the extent that the
health and economic well-being of the citizens of New Helios have
been injured. Typhoid, unpotable water, damaged recreational
facilities and a substantial economic burden on one of New
Helios' major industries all testify to the injury that results from
Karma's current uses of the waterways. This injury will be com-
pounded if Karma's activities are allowed to continue. These ac-
tions must be deemed polluting under the explicit treaty lan-
guage. That such acts are to be considered polluting within the
ordinary meaning of the term is further demonstrated by the
attitude of the International Law Association [hereinafter
referred to as ILA] as to what constitutes a polluting use of an
international drainage basin. In 1966, the ILA adopted the follow-
ing definition in its Rules on the Uses of the Waters of Interna-
tional Rivers: "[T]he term 'water pollution' refers to any detri-
mental change resulting from human conduct in the natural com-
position, content, or quality of the waters of an international
drainage basin." 5 Publicists are in agreement.'
In the absence of any specific technical definition in the 1923
Treaty of what constitutes a polluting use, the natural and ordi-
nary meaning encompasses the clearly injurious acts initiated by
Karma. New Helios acknowledges that in order to be polluting
the usage must not institute a mere trifling change. The injuries
already caused by Karma have resulted in both a significant dilu-
tion of the overall quality of the shared waters as well as a quanti-
tative drop in the volume of potable water available. A vast num-
ber of treaties describe a polluting act as one which is injurious
or deleterious to the health or well-being of other uses of shared
waters.'
4. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, Art. 31; Advisory Opinion on the Admission of
States to the United Nations, [1950] I.C.J. 4, 8.
5. International Law Association [hereinafter cited as ILA], Helsinki Rules on the
Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, Report of the Fifty-second Conference,
Helsinki, adopted Aug. 20, 1966 [hereinafter cited as Helsinki Rules].
6. See Lester, Pollution, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINs 89, 90 (A. Gar-
retson, R. Hayton & C. Olmstead eds. 1967).
7. See, e.g., Exchange of Notes between the United States and Canada constituting
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An examination of the 1923 Treaty in its entirety demon-
strates that in negotiating the treaty, both parties paid special
heed to the problems of pollution. It is significant that the first
subject discussed after the preambular language of Article I is the
problem of water pollution.' Such a specific water pollution provi-
sion was not adopted by indirection; it is clear that the parties
committed themselves to a non-polluting use of shared water-
ways.
Karma's usage of the waters shows a lack of good faith and
is violative of Karma's equitable as well as legal responsibilities
under the 1923 Treaty. Karma's actions are particularly repre-
hensible in light of New Helios' repeated protests and its willing-
ness to discuss treaty disagreements. New Helios' complaints
have been met with curt answers and, furthermore, no offer of
compensation has been made. Such actions controvert recognized
principles requiring a state to act reasonably and equitably with
its co-riparians, even in the absence of specific treaty obligations.
The Commission on the Non-maritime Utilization of Interna-
tional Waters agrees, for example, that one of the fundamental
principles of international law in this area includes the following
prohibition:
No state can undertake works or utilization of a watercourse or
hydrographic basin which seriously affect the possibility of utili-
zation of the same waters by other states, except on condition
of assuring the enjoyment of the advantages to which they are
entitled . . . as well as adequate compensation for any loss or
damage.'
Karma's breach of the 1923 Treaty alone places it in violation of
its responsibilities under international law.
an Agreement on the St. Lawrence Waterway, Feb. 27, 1959, Section F, 341 U.N.T.S. 4,
6; Convention between Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union concerning
Fishing in the Waters of the Danube, Jan. 29,1958, Art. 7, 339 U.N.T.S. 58, 63; Agreement
between Poland and East Germany concerning Navigation in Frontier Waters and the
Maintenance and Use of Frontier Waters, Feb. 6, 1952, Art. 17, 304 U.N.T.S. 130, 168.
8. See 1923 Treaty, Art. II.
9. Institute of International Law, "Salzburg Resolution" (1961) Art. 4, reported in 56
AM. J. INT'L L. 737, 738 (1962). See also ILA, Report of the Forty-eighth Conference,
Agreed Recommendation No. 1 (1958).
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II. Karma is contravening generally recognized principles of
international law through its use of shared waterways to the
detriment of a co-basin state.
A. As a co-riparian, Karma's actions violate the principles of sic
utere and droit de voisinage.
Karma has neither exercised vigilance or concern nor made
any effort to abate the extraterritorial harm caused by its actions.
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedus ("use your property so as not
to injure that of another") is one of the "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" which must be examined under
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.',
The principle was applied as early as 1900 by a Swiss Federal
Tribunal which held that no state may use its territory in such a
way as to threaten the lives of persons in an adjoining state's
territory." In the Trail Smelter Arbitration,2 the only previous
international adjudication dealing directly with an environmen-
tal pollution claim, the Tribunal found that
under the principles of international law, as well as of the law
of the United States, no State has the right to use or permit the
use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes
in or to the territory of another or the properties or person
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury
is established by clear and convincing evidence. 3
Similarly, in his concurrence in the Corfu Channel4 opinion,
Judge Alvarez pointed out that "every State is bound to exercise
proper vigilance in its territory" and that failure to do so will
render the state responsible for injury to other states and their
nationals.15
A large volume of treaty law concerning the pollution of
international lakes and rivers also testifies to the world com-
munity's adherence to the principle of limited territorial sover-
eignty. "Existing treaty practice demonstrates at a minimum
that numerous nation states have limited their freedom to pollute
10. 1 H. LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 346-7 (8th ed. 1955).
11. Cantons of Soleure v. Argovie, discussed in 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 149 (1921).
12. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Canada), 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941) [hereinafter cited as
Trail Smelter].
13. Id. at 1965-66.
14. Corfu Channel [1949] I.C.J. 4 [hereinafter cited as Corfu Channel], cf. Case of
the S.S. "Lotus" [1927] P.C.I.J. 18, ser. A, No. 10.
15. Corfu Channel at 44.
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international streams and lakes and thereby have practiced the
principle of limited sovereignty."' 6
The recent Helsinki Rules support the doctrine of sic utere.
"Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable
and equitable share in the beneficial use of the water of an inter-
national drainage basin.' 1 7 The concept of a reasonable and equi-
table share in the beneficial use of water serves as a particularized
definition of an acceptable use of property under the doctrine of
sic utere. In 1972 the world community also expressed its support
for the doctrine:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions and the principles of international law, the sovereign right
to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environ-
mental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.
Karma has violated the principle of sic utere by using shared
waterways without concern for extraterritorial consequences. The
disposal of human and industrial waste is but one example of
Karma's disregard of this principle. Perhaps the most flagrant
violation is construction of the nuclear power plant at a site which
is particularly harmful to New Helios.
Karma is liable for damage to New Helios and its nationals
under the well-established rules of voisinage as well as under the
international concept of sic utere. The droit de voisinage refers to
rules and practices which arise solely out of the contiguity of two
states. One such rule is that "[n]o state may change the natural
flow or state of a frontier river or of any watercourse which flows
from one state into another in any manner which causes the other
state damage." 9
Karma's practice of allowing the emission of harmful pollu-
tants from its territory into shared river and lake waters changes
the state of these waterways to the substantial injury of New
16. Utton, International Water Quality Law, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 157
(L. Teclaff & A. Utton eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Utton].
17. Helsinki Rules, Art. IV.
18. Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declara-
tion on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14, Principle 21 (1972) (empha-
sis added) [hereinafter cited as Stockholm Declaration].
19. N. GREN, INTERNATIONAL LAw 190 (1973). See also F. BERBER, RIVERS IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAw 211-23 (1959); Hull & Koers, A Regime for World Ocean Pollution Control,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE FuTuRE OF OCEAN SPACE 101 (R. Wirsing ed. 1974).
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Helios and its nationals. This practice defies international princi-
ples of sic utere and voisinage.
B. Karma is responsible to New Helios under the recognized
principle of strict liability.
Karma must be held strictly liable to New Helios for injury
caused by pollution. The concept of strict liability has been ac-
cepted in international law, as evidenced by conventions regard-
ing oil pollution at sea, radioactive materials, and liability for
damage caused by space objects. 0 Indicative of the application
of strict liability to the international law of pollution are the
voluntary actions of several states which had caused injury to
other states. On two occasions when negligence would have been
very difficult to prove, the United States voluntarily assumed
responsibility for international pollution. Following a 1954 nu-
clear test in the Marshall Islands in which negligence was never
established, the United States tendered $2,000,000 ex gratia to
compensate Japan for damages resulting to its fishermen.'
The Trail Smelter and Corfu Channel cases may be viewed
as evidence of the emergence of strict liability as a principle of
international law. In the Trail Smelter arbitration, Canada's lia-
bility for the discharge of sulphur dioxide fumes across the border
into Washington State was not at issue. Canada admitted liabil-
ity and the Special Arbitral Tribunal was instructed to determine
only the extent of damage and the remedies to be administered.
If Trail Smelter is to be viewed, as it should be, as an applica-
tion of public international law, rather than of common law, the
irreducible minimum of the relevant general principles of law
contained therein is the strict liability which Canada owed to
the United States. 2
The Corfu Channel case has been interpreted as establishing
"prima facie liability for the harmful effects of conditions created
even by trespassers of which the territorial sovereign has knowl-
20. See, e.g., International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage,
Nov. 29, 1969, Arts. IV and V, 9 INT'L LEG. MAT'S 45, 48-51 (1970); Convention of Interna-
tional Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, Art. III, reported in
66 AM. J. INT'L L. 702, 703 (1972).
21. Property Damages Resulting from Nuclear Tests in the Marshall Islands, Jan. 4,
1955, T.I.A.S. No. 3160. See also Bikini Atoll (1954 fallout), H.R. REP. No. 110, 88th Cong.
1st Sess. (1963) and H.R. Rep. No. 1193, 88th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1964).
22. Goldie, Development of an International Environmental Law-An Appraisal,
LAW, INsTrrmoNS, AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 132 (J. Hargrove ed. 1972).
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edge or means of knowledge."23 The Lake Lanoux Tribunal also
considered that strict liability would govern in the event of a
finding for Spain. The decision in favor of France was due to the
Tribunal's conclusion that Spain had not shown any injury; if
France's activities were harmful,
[i]t could have been argued that the works would bring about
a definitive pollution of the waters of the Carol or that the
returned waters would have a chemical composition or a tem-
perature or some other characteristic which could injure Span-
ish interests. Spain could then have claimed that her rights had
been impaired ....
In none of these three cases was the issue of fault primary; liabil-
ity was assumed if damage could be found. Substantial damage
has been shown in the instant controversy, as evidenced by the
fact that both New Helios and the Lower Peace Brewery have
already incurred considerable expenses and will incur docu-
mented expenses of at least $2,900,000 in the future. The cases
discussed above require that Karma be held strictly liable for the
substantial injury to New Helios without reference to negligence
or intent.
C. Karma's actions violate international law because New
Helios has established prior and preferential uses.
Karma has the right to reasonable use of shared waters under
the 1923 Treaty and, as a co-basin state, under the Helsinki
Rules; this right must, however, be balanced against the long-
established international doctrine of prior use. New Helios' pres-
ent and prior established uses of the shared waters are greatly
jeopardized by Karma's unreasonable and substantially harmful
activities. Several treaties have supported the view that prior
uses should be accorded preference. 25
The goal of equitable utilization "is to provide maximum
benefit to each basin State from the uses of the waters with mini-
23. Brownlie, A Survey of International Customary Rules of Environmental
Protection, INTERNATIoNAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1, 2 (L. Teclaff & A. Utton eds. 1974).
24. Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v. France), 12 U.N.R.I.A.A. 281 (1957), 53 AM.
J. INT'L L. 156, 160-161 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Lake Lanoux].
25. See, e.g., General Convention concerning the Hydraulic System concluded be-
tween Rumania and Yugoslavia, Dec. 14, 1931, Art. 19, 135 L.N.T.S. 71, 88 (safeguarded
already acquired rights); Agreement concerning the Frontier between Germany and Bel-
gium, Nov. 7, 1929, Art. 70, 121 L.N.T.S. 327, 365 (recognition of servitudes imposed).
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mum detriment to each. '2 6 Article V of the Helsinki Rules lists
relevant factors to be considered in determining what is reason-
able and equitable. While under Article VI, no use is "entitled to
any inherent preference over any other use," a general considera-
tion under Article V is whether a use is essential to human life.27
Surely the most essential use of water and that with priority is
that for human potation. The capital of New Helios has drawn
drinking water from International Lake since first habitation.
Such use fulfills a social and economic need, as required by Arti-
cle V(e), as do uses for recreation and for production by the Lower
Peace Brewery. Under Article V(f) the "population dependent on
the waters of the basin in each basin State" is to be considered
in determining equitable utilization. The capital of New Helios
and not that of Karma is located on International Lake. Treaty
law also lends support to New Helios' contention that use of these
waters for drinking purposes in particular should be accorded a
preference.2 While it may be argued that use by a commercial
brewery is no more valuable than use by Karma's commercial
pulp and paper mill, the fact remains that New Helios' uses were
"existing" as contemplated by Article V(d) long before Karma
began its unreasonable use of the waters. The fact that Karma's
mill has been in operation for ten years does not defeat this prior-
ity for two reasons: the effects of pollution cannot always be de-
tected rapidly, and New Helios has already been forced to take
remedial measures in the past. New Helios has never used shared
waters to the substantial detriment of its co-basin state.
D. Because Karma and New Helios share a unified basin,
Karma's failure to notify and negotiate as to planned uses was in
derogation of its duties under international law.
The current practice in international law is to look at a water
system as a unified whole, employing such terms as "river basin,"
"drainage basin," or "hydrographic basin." It is of no import that
the Upper Peace River is wholly within the territory of Karma.
As early as 1929, the Polish government contended that the juris-
26. J. BARRos & D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUrION 78 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as BAmos].
27. BARnos at 79.
28. See, e.g., Treaty between the United States and Mexico relating to the Utilization
of the Waters of the Colorado, Feb. 3, 1944, Art. 5, 59 Stat. 1219, T.S.N. 994, 3 U.N.T.S.
313, 324; Treaty between Great Britain and the United States relating to Boundary Wa-
ters and Questions arising along the Boundary between the United States and Canada,
Jan. 11, 1909, Art. VII, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S.N. 548.
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diction of the International Commission of the Oder did not ex-
tend to the navigable portions of tributaries wholly within Po-
land. The Permanent Court of International Justice disagreed
and held in the Oder River" case that the two rivers solely within
the geographic boundaries of Poland were a part of the unified
River Oder system and, therefore, subject to the Commission's
authority. In 1958, the ILA adopted the term "international
drainage basin" and defined it as "an area within the territories
of two or more States in which all the streams of flowing surface
water. . . drain a common watershed terminating in a common
outlet or common outlets either to the sea or to a lake"; it further
established a principle of international law that "a system of
rivers and lakes in a drainage basin should be treated as an inte-
grated whole (and not piece-meal)."3 ° As a state sharing an inter-
national drainage basin and as a riparian owner, New Helios has
rights regarding the entire basin system, including the Upper and
Lower Peace Rivers and International Lake, and Karma has rec-
ognized obligations.
Under the Helsinki Rules, a state
(a) must prevent any new form of water pollution or any in-
crease in the degree of existing water pollution in an interna-
tional drainage basin which would cause substantial injury in
the territory of a co-basin State, and (b) should take all reason-
able measures to abate existing water pollution in an interna-
tional drainage basin to such an extent that no substantial dam-
age is caused in the territory of a co-basin State."
A state violating (a) must "cease the wrongful conduct and com-
pensate the injured co-basin State for the injury that has been
caused to it," and a state failing to take measures under (b) "shall
be required promptly to enter into negotiations with the injured
State with a view toward reaching a settlement equitable under
the circumstances. ' 32 The Stockholm Conference recommended
"that the attention of Governments be drawn to the need to con-
sult bilaterally or regionally whenever environmental conditions
29. Case of the Oder River, [1929] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 23.
30. ILA, Report of the Forty-eighth Conference 99, New York (1958). See also Con-
vention between Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union concerning Fishing
in the Waters of the Danube, Jan. 29, 1958, 339 U.N.T.S. 58 (1959); Geneva Convention
relating to the development of hydraulic power affecting more than one State, Dec. 9,
1923, 36 L.N.T.S. 77.
31. Helsinki Rules, Art. X.
32. Helsinki Rules, Art. XI (2).
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or development plans in one country could have repercussions in
one or more neighboring countries. '3 3 The recent Recommen-
dations of the European Organization for Economic Co-operation
and Development require that "[c]ountries should refrain from
carrying out projects or activities which might create a significant
risk of transfrontier pollution without first informing the coun-
tries which are or may be affected. . . ."I The duties of notice
and of negotiation or arbitration among co-basin states have be-
come generally accepted principles of international law, as evi-
denced by numerous treaties governing river basins. Articles III
and IV of the 1923 Treaty, as well as numerous other treaties
governing river basins, evidence acceptance of this principle."
Treaties have required that advance consultation be obtained
before proceeding with new and potentially harmful uses of
shared waterways. This has been especially important when
radioactive substances have been involved.
The Lake Lanoux Arbitration3 s is the latest international
juridical expression relating to environmental regulations. The
Tribunal stated that an
upstream State has, according to the rules of good faith, the
obligation to take into consideration the different interests at
stake, to strive to give them all satisfactions compatible with the
pursuit of its own interests, and to demonstrate that. . . it has
a real solicitude to reconcile the interests of the other riparian
with its own. 39
The Tribunal further noted that a state is obligated under inter-
33. Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Recommendations
on the Planning and Management of Human Settlements for Environmental Quality,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14, Rec. 3 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Recommendations on Plan-
ning and Management].
34. OECD, Recommendations of the Council on Principles Concerning Transfrontier
Pollution, Title E (8), C(74)224 (Nov. 21, 1974).
35. See, e.g., Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan, Sept. 19, 1960, Art.
9, 419 U.N.T.S. 125, 150; Convention between Austria and Yugoslavia concerning water
economy questions relating to the Drava, May 25, 1954, Art. 7, 227 U.N.T.S. 128, 132;
Geneva Convention relating to the Development of Hydraulic Power affecting more than
one State, Dec. 9, 1923, Art. 12, 36 L.N.T.S. 77, 85.
36. See, e.g., Convention between Austria and Yugoslavia concerning water economy
questions relating to the Drava, May 25, 1954, Art. 4, 227 U.N.T.S. 128, 132; Convention
between Baden-Wurttemberg, Bavaria, Austria on the Protection of Lake Constance
against Pollution, Oct. 26, 1960, 1 Feuille f~ddrale de ]a Confdration Suisse 1171 (1961)..
37. See, e.g., Treaty establishing EURATOM, Mar. 25, 1957, Art. 37, 298 U.N.T.S.
169, 185.
38. Lake Lanoux, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 156.
39. Id. at 169.
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national law to undertake preliminary negotiations and to give
notice of intended actions. The selection of a site for a nuclear
plant is particularly crucial and should be subject to the highest
degree of scrutiny before a project is undertaken. Karma has
placed its nuclear plant ten miles from the capital of New Helios
and fifty miles from its own capital, thus exposing the citizens of
New Helios to the risk of harm from a radioactive accident. This
is particularly significant since it is the businessmen in Karma's
capital who apparently require the electrical energy. The Corfu
Channel0 case held that a state has a duty to warn other states
of disasters, and Karma clearly has not met this duty. A nuclear
plant creates the possibility of radioactive accidents. In violation
of international law and of the 1923 Treaty, Karma did not ex-
hibit solicitude for the rights of its co-basin state; nor did it give
notice or negotiate. Karma demonstrated bad faith and flaunted
international obligations through its curt responses to repeated
protests by New Helios. The Stockholm Recommendations urged
"that the attention of Governments be drawn to the need to con-
sult bilaterally or regionally whenever environmental conditions
or development plans in one country could have repercussions in
one or more neighboring countries."4 Karma made no effort to
consult or cooperate. Laylin stresses the international duty to
arbitrate water disputes and emphasizes that water disputes are
unlike those which involve other common resources since mone-
tary damages are rarely adequate.12 Karma showed no solicitude
for the citizens of New Helios and acted in flagrant violation of
its obligation to enter into prior negotiations.
III. Karma's status as a developing nation does not relieve it of
its fundamental responsibility to protect the environment.
Pollution causes irreparable harm, and its continuance is
particularly alarming in view of the fact that many effects of
pollution are as yet unknown. "Since the flow of river waters
follows the dictates of gravity rather than arbitrary political
boundaries, one country's sanitation is another's poison. 43 In-
deed, it is possible that undiscoverable effects of pollutants intro-
40. See note 14 supra.
41. Recommendations on Planning and Management, Rec. 3.
42. Laylin & Bianchi, The Role of Adjudication in International River Disputes: The
Lake Lanoux Case, 53 Am. J. Int'l L. 30, 31 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Laylin].
43. Utton at 154.
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duced into the shared waterways by Karma are being inflicted
upon the entire world. The disregard exhibited by Karma in pol-
luting the Upper Peace River, International Lake, the Lower
Peace River and, ultimately, the ocean is irresponsible and intol-
erable. The ocean represents the common heritage of mankind.4
The Stockholm Principles further provide that "[s]tates shall
take all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by sub-
stances that are liable to create hazards to human health, to harm
living resources and marine life, to damage amenities or to inter-
fere with other legitimate uses of the sea."4
In convening the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment, the United Nations General Assembly cited pollu-
tion as a "continuing and accelerating impairment of the quality
of the human environment."46 The Stockholm Declaration in-
cluded the following:
[t]he discharge of toxic substances or of other substances and
the release of heat, in such quantities or concentrations as to
exceed the capacity of the environment to render them harm-
less, must be halted in order to ensure that serious or irreversible
damage is not inflicted on ecosystems."
It is unilateral actions such as Karma's which will bring us to the
brink of ecocatastrophe. The essence of the Stockholm Declara-
tion is that the human environment must be preserved and en-
hanced and that man's present destructive tendencies must be
curtailed. The occasional references to the status of developing
nations do not create a special license to pollute but rather ex-
press the belief that they must avoid such detrimental side effects
of industrialization.
Expressing the strong hope that the developing countries will,
through appropriate international cooperation, derive particular
benefit from the mobilization of knowledge and experience
about the problems of the human environment, enabling them,
inter alia, to forestall the occurrence of many such problems. 8
The Stockholm Recommendations on Development and Environ-
ment direct that "special care be taken [by the developing coun-
44. See Geneva Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 28, 1958, Art. 25, 12 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
45. Stockholm Declaration, Principle 7.
46. G.A. Res. 2398 (XXIII) (1968).
47. Stockholm Declaration, Principle 6.
48. G.A. Res. 2398 (XXIII) (1968).
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tries] to apply the appropriate international standards on envi-
ronment in order to avoid the creation of pollution problems in
developing countries."49 Karma has never acknowledged its re-
sponsibility to the human environment, and it has and continues
to pollute without regard for the consequences. A "developing
nation" label may justify the acquisition of funds to prevent pol-
lution during industrialization and to make the products of
poorer nations competitive, but it must not be used as an excuse
for ignoring the basic responsibilities of every state to its neigh-
bors and to the world at large.
The import of the Helsinki Rules is also that detrimental
effects must be avoided. In determining equitable utilization, the
economic position of a state is but one of eleven considerations.
Regardless of developing nation status, a nation oversteps its
right to equitable utilization when it causes substantial injury to
a co-basin state.
The fact that New Helios happens to share the waters pol-
luted by Karma does not place the financial burden of repairing
damage caused by that pollution upon New Helios. The Preamble
of the Stockholm Declaration cites the need for international co-
operation "in order to raise resources to support the developing
countries in carrying out their responsibilities" in protecting the
environment.50 It may be incumbent upon the world community
to provide funds to aid developing countries in the avoidance of
pollution. However, international law does not require a devel-
oped nation to subsidize or repair damage done to it by develop-
ing countries within its vicinity. Such a harsh and unwarranted
rule would lead to highly inequitable results. Even if the world
community wishes to give special privileges to Karma as a devel-
oping nation through partial indemnification for damages paid to
New Helios, it is still compulsory that Karma first be required to
fully compensate New Helios. Any other decision would place a
financial burden upon New Helios for no other reason than geo-
graphic happenstance.
In light of the overwhelming weight of international conven-
tional, customary, and case law condemning the acts of Karma,
New Helios has shown restraint and good faith in restricting its
action to repeated pleas for relief from the pollution and in stead-
49. Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Recommendations
on Development and Environment, U.N. Doc. AICONF.48/14, Rec. 106 (1972).
50. See note 18 supra.
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fastly seeking arbitration. Because of the highly egregious nature
of the acts committed by Karma, New Helios is entitled to the
full measure of relief available under international law.
IV. Karma's actions entitle New Helios to injunctive and
monetary relief.
A. New Helios is entitled to injunctive relief.
An injunction should issue to cease operation of the pulp mill
until treatment facilities are constructed to eliminate industrial
waste. Karma is responsible for the mill company as an entity
which is operating within its borders. The merging of identity of
a state and its nationals is illustrated by Trail Smelter, and the
responsibility of a state for activities within its borders, irrespec-
tive of knowledge, is illustrated by Corfu Channel. The ILA has
found a state responsible, under international law, for public and
private acts which it could have prevented with reasonable dili-
gence producing a change in the existing regime of a river to the
injury of another state.5' Karma accepted the advice of the World
Development Authority in constructing the plant but chose not
to accept a recommendation which would protect the environ-
ment, nor did Karma attempt to secure a loan from the World
Bank to finance the necessary protections. Under the Helsinki
Rules, Karma must take "reasonable measures to abate" existing
pollution.52 If Karma pleads inability or unwillingness to abate,
it should be forced to cease operation of the mill.
The mill company should be directed to build the housing
facilities which it promised, and can apparently afford. Even
these measures will only alleviate the problem, however, which
underscores the need for injunctive relief. Such relief is especially
appropriate in the instant controversy. "The common remedy of
response in monetary compensation following a breach of an in-
ternational obligation is rarely adequate in the case of a substan-
tial change in the regime of a river system on which nations
depend for their livelihood. '53
An interim measure of protection should be issued under
I.C.J. STAT. art. 41, para. 1, to prevent the full operation of
Karma's nuclear power plant. Under the newly-amended Rules
51. 3 WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 926 (1964).
52. Helsinki Rules, Art. X.
53. Laylin at 31.
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of the I.C.J., Article 66, the request for an interim measure has
priority. 4 Under I.C.J. STAT. art. 27, decisions of a three-judge
tribunal have the same effect as one delivered by the whole
Court. It is a generally accepted principle of international law
that the status quo must be maintained once a proceeding has
been initiated 5 An interim measure is particularly suited to a
case where jurisdiction has been voluntarily accepted and where
the nature of the harm, namely damage to the environment, is
irrevocable. In the Nuclear Test Cases,5" the test for an interim
measure was defined as a twofold one: "irreparable prejudice"
which is an "immediate possibility," and a prima facie showing
that the claims are cognizable under international law. Both tests
are met in the instant case. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction7 case,
an interim measure was granted even though damages might be
available as an appropriate remedy. A sense of urgency must be
shown for an interim measure to be granted, and this test is also
met in the instant case." The nuclear plant is currently operating
at a ten percent capacity and must be ordered to maintain this
level pending arbitration. An injunction should issue making the
provisional measure a permanent one against Karma's operation
of the nuclear plant or, in the alternative, directing Karma to re-
locate the plant where it will be less harmful to New Helios.
It can be argued that the nuclear plant involves only a case
of prospective harm and thus under Lake Lanoux no remedy is
available until actual harm is shown. In Lake Lanoux, however,
the denial of an injunction for potential risk was because bad
faith was not presumed and France had shown "solicitude." In
the instant case, Karma has been curt in its responses and has
shown no solicitude. Karma had a duty to obtain prior consent
from New Helios; France was found to have no duty to obtain
prior consent precisely because France had shown solicitude and
"taken into account" the interests of other states. Karma cannot
attempt to place itself in the same posture.
B. New Helios is entitled to monetary damages.
Karma is responsible in damages for the brewery's investiga-
54. 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 195, 215-16 (1973).
55. S. ROSENNE, LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 427 (1965).
56. 12 INT'L LEG. MAT'S 749, 752-53 (1973).
57. 11 INT'L LEG. MAT'S 1069 (1972).
58. Interhandel, [1957] I.C.J. 104; Electric Co. of Sofia and Bulgaria, [1939]
P.C.I.J. ser. A/B, No. 79, 191, 199.
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tion expenses and future expenses for cooling lagoons if no injunc-
tion is issued. The brewery's investigation expenses are clearly
compensable since the brewery is a national and not a state.
Under Trail Smelter, investigation expenses were denied to the
United States because they were claimed as an element of dam-
ages to sovereignty and because the United States law of damages
does not include such costs. In the instant controversy, investiga-
tion expenses are specifically claimed by New Helios as compen-
satory damage. Karma is also responsible in damages for
amounts spent by New Helios to restore the beaches and render
the water potable, as well as the documented costs of $2,000,000
for further purification if no remedial action is taken.
New Helios is entitled to compensatory damages for personal
injury to its citizens who are typhoid victims and to additional
compensation for violation of sovereignty as a result of these per-
sonal injuries. The I'm Alone59 case involved personal injuries to
Canadian civilians and damages of $25,000 were awarded over
and above the amount intended to compensate the victims.
Karma should be ordered to provide an indemnity against
future damages and future investigation expenses as well as cre-
ate a contingency plan for radioactive accidents. The indemnity
for future damages and investigation expenses were remedies
granted in Trail Smelter, the only other international arbitration
of a pollution claim. The contingency plan serves to emphasize
the gravity of risk to which Karma has subjected the citizens of
New Helios.
CONCLUSION
Since Karma's actions violate the 1923 Treaty and recog-
nized principles of international law, this Court should require
Karma to halt its offending activities and to reimburse New He-
lios for damages suffered.
MEMORIAL FOR RESPONDENT
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Karma's use of the Upper and Lower Peace Rivers and Inter-
national Lake is not substantially harmful to New Helios and is
not violative of its obligations under the 1923 Treaty of Amity,
Friendship and Economic Cooperation or under generally recog-
59. I'm Alone Case (Canada v. United States), 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1616 (1935).
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nized principles of international law. As a developing nation,
Karma is not subject to the same standards of pollution control
as is a developed nation. New Helios is not entitled to injunctive
relief or monetary damages; as a developed co-basin state, New
Helios should bear present expenses of pollution control in order
to allow equitable utilization of the entire drainage basin.
ARGUMENT
I. Karma's uses of the international drainage basin are
authorized by fundamental principles of international law.
A. Karma's uses are reasonable under the doctrine of equitable
utilization.
The waterways Karma shares with New Helios constitute an
international drainage basin and are subject to an emerging body
of international law governing such waters. An international
drainage basin has been defined as "a geographical area extend-
ing to or over the territory of two or more states and is bounded
by the watershed extremities of the system of waters, including
surface and underground waters, all of which flow into a common
terminus.""
The International Law Association [hereinafter referred to
as ILA] recently adopted the most comprehensive examination
and restatement of emerging customary law regarding interna-
tional river systems and drainage basins. 1 The ILA formulated
principles of equitable utilization under which "[e]ach basin
State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equita-
ble share in the beneficial use of the water of an international
drainage basin."62 A basin state has rights equal and correlative
with those of other co-basin states, but that "does not mean that
each such State will receive an identical share in the uses of the
waters. 63 Weighing factors must be considered, and "[w]hat is
a reasonable and equitable share within the meaning of Article
IV is to be determined in the light of all the relevant factors in
each particular case."64 For example, one factor of considerable
60. Olmstead, Introduction, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DMANAGE BASINS 4 (A. Gar-
retson, R. Hayton & C. Olmstead eds. 1967).
61. International Law Association [hereinafter cited as ILA], Report of the 52d
Conference, Helsinki, adopted Aug. 20, 1966 [hereinafter cited as Helsinki Rules].
62. Helsinki Rules, Art. IV.
63. J. BAluos & D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 78 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as BARRos].
64. Helsinki Rules, Art. V.
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significance in the instant controversy is ". . . the contribution
of water by each basin State."65 Because the Upper Peace River
and a substantial portion of the Lower Peace River are solely
within its boundaries, Karma clearly supplies a dispropor-
tionately large share of the water.
Equitable utilization is also a guiding principle for a number
of contemporary agreements regulating the use of specific drain-
age basins."6
Karma's uses of the Upper and Lower Peace Rivers and of
International Lake are consistent with the doctrine of equitable
utilization as delimited by Article V of the Helsinki Rules. Not
only are the uses practiced by Karma socially and economically
valuable, but they are also essential to human life." The rapid
industrialization of Karma is necessary for the mere economic
survival of its people. The World Development Authority deter-
mined that the operation of a pulp and paper mill would be the
most socially and economically valuable means of aiding the de-
velopment of Karma. Equally necessary for the well-being of
Karma is the production of energy by the newly-constructed nu-
clear plant. These essential uses of shared waters may be causing
temporary inconvenience to New Helios, but Karma urges that
minimal pollution is necessary for its equitable utilization of the
waters and that modification of such uses would deprive Karma
of its rights under international law.
B. Karma's uses do not cause substantial harm or serious conse-
quence to New Helios.
Water pollution has been defined as "any detrimental
change resulting from human conduct in the natural composition,
content, or quality of the waters of an international drainage
basin. '6 8 There is no proof of detrimental change to the waters
65. Helsinki Rules, Art. V(b).
66. Recent bilateral agreements evidencing such an orientation include: Treaty be-
tween the United States and Canada Relating to Cooperative Development of the water
resources of the Columbia River Basin, Jan. 17, 1961, 15 U.S.T. 1555, T.I.A.S. No. 5638,
542 U.N.T.S. 244; Agreement between Egypt and Sudan for Full Utilization of the Nile
Waters, Nov. 8, 1959, 453 U.N.T.S. 51; Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan,
Sept. 19, 1960, 419 U.N.T.S. 126 [hereinafter cited as Indus Waters Treaty]. Recent
multilateral agreements employing this approach include: Act Regarding Navigation and
Economic Cooperation Between the States of the Niger Basin, Oct. 26, 1963, Art. 2, 587
U.N.T.S. 9, 13; Convention between Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union
concerning Fishing in the Waters of the Danube, Jan. 29, 1958, 339 U.N.T.S. 58.
67. See BARnos at 79.
68. Helsinki Rules, Art. IX.
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which Karma and New Helios share because the content of a
small body of water like International Lake is renewed every six
months or less. Water changes caused by Karma are required for
development, and need not be permanent. It is only necessary
later to eliminate the source of pollution, and let nature take its
course. "If the pollution was caused by the incoming river and if
that pollution source was stopped, one would expect to see a
marked change in the pollution level of the lake in a very few
months."69 Soon after it is economically feasible for Karma and
the mill company to install facilities to avoid pollution, shared
waters will be naturally cleaned.
A state is not under a duty to take pollution prevention or
control measures which would deprive it of equitable utilization.
Liability attaches only where the use of water is inconsistent with
the principle of equitable utilization. A state must abate water
pollution in an international drainage basin only to the extent
that "substantial damage is caused in the territory of a co-basin
State."70 This requirement has also been evidenced by recent
international agreements. A treaty between India and Pakistan
is instructive: "Each party agrees to prevent as far as is practica-
ble undue pollution . . . [and] will take all reasonable mea-
sures, and before any sewage or waste is allowed to flow it will be
treated in such a manner not to affect those uses."' 7' Karma is not
causing substantial injury to New Helios and, therefore, has no
duty to abate because the expenditures necessary to correct this
injury are not substantial for a developed country but are unrea-
sonable abatement measures for a developing country.
A beneficial use under Article IV of the Helsinki Rules need
not incorporate the most efficient methods of effluent control
since states are held to a standard commensurate with their fin-
ancial resources; an economically advanced state would thus be
required to employ a more efficient and less wasteful system than
a developing one. "[I]n its application, the present rule is not
designed to foster waste but to hold States to a duty of efficiency
which is commensurate with their financial resources. ' 72 The var-
ious uses of shared waters in the present controversy may be
69. Knauss, Ocean Pollution: Status and Prognostication, LAW OF THE SEA: THE
EMERGING REGIME OF THE OcEANs 321 (J. Gamble & G. Pontecorvo eds. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as Knauss].
70. Helsinki Rules, Art. X(1)(b).
71. Indus Waters Treaty, Art. IV(10) at 138.
72. BARRos at 78.
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rendered compatible, as suggested under Article V of the Helsinki
Rules, by the expenditure of sums of money which are de minimis
for a country with the degree of industrialization and standard of
living that New Helios enjoys. Under equitable utilization, it is
the duty of co-basin states, according to financial ability, to con-
struct works to accommodate competing uses.73 If New Helios
suffers injury, it is a result of its own failure to meet the responsi-
bilities incumbent upon a developed nation sharing an interna-
tional drainage basin with a developing nation. New Helios is
financially able to construct purification facilities without harm
to its economy. If Karma were forced to spend such sums, its
development would be severely retarded. If the privately owned
pulp and paper mill in Karma's Wilderness Region were required
at this point to install facilities or to compensate New Helios, its
products would become non-competitive in the world market. It
is certainly reasonable to suggest as well that the Lower Peace
Brewery, whose product is of questionable social value, install
purification facilities and cooling lagoons, if necessary, at its own
expense. A manufacturer enjoying worldwide distribution for
thirty years can well afford to do so.
The only previous international arbitration concerning pollu-
tion involved fumes flowing from a Canadian smelter into the
United States. 74 Canada's fault was not at issue in Trail Smelter,
and the Tribunal was only requested to determine the extent of
damages. The Tribunal stated, however, that under the princi-
ples of international law, Canada did not have
the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a man-
ner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another
or the properties or persons therein, when the case [was] of
serious consequence and the injury [was] established by clear
and convincing evidence.7"
There is a significant distinction to be made between a developed
country such as Canada and a struggling, developing nation such
as Karma. The damage caused by the fumes emanating from the
smelter was of serious consequence and Canada could well afford
to adopt reasonable measures of abatement and to pay compensa-
tory damages. There are no serious consequences in the instant
73. Helsinki Rules, Art. V(j).
74. Trail Smelter (United States v. Canada), 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941) [hereinafter
cited as Trail Smelter].
75. Trail Smelter at 1965.
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controversy, but even if there were, Karma should not be forced
to pay damages. Unlike Canada, Karma cannot afford abatement
costs. Under certain international agreements, even parties who
are able to compensate fully for damages are only held liable to
a limited extent.76
C. In the absence of a threat of substantial harm or serious
consequence, Karma was under no duty to negotiate with New
Helios in regard to proposed projects.
The mere chance of environmental harm is not sufficient to
grant veto power to one state over another state's projected inter-
nal economic development. Indeed, the doctrine of equitable uti-
lization supports the concept that a veto power exists only where
the co-basin state can no longer exercise its right of equitable
utilization. Under the Helsinki Rules, the duty to negotiate does
not arise until a party has failed under Article X(1)(b) to take
reasonable measures to abate existing water pollution. Only then
will a party "be required promptly to enter into negotiations with
the injured State with a view toward reaching a settlement equi-
table under the circumstances."77 In the present controversy,
"Karma requested that the matter be brought to arbitration" in
the spirit of amity, friendship and economic cooperation and not
because Karma felt it actions had created substantial harm and
hence a duty to negotiate.
The Tribunals in Lake Lanoux5 and Trail Smelter showed a
concern for economic growth and did not allow one state to exer-
cise veto power over the proposed actions of its neighbor. In Lake
Lanoux, Spain did not show that the French dam would cause
actual harm to Spanish territory, but demonstrated only poten-
tial harm. The Tribunal stated that the potential risk of adverse
effects was not a valid reason for enjoining construction and re-
fused to do so even though the risk of serious danger remained.
The benefits of the project were balanced against the possible
adverse effects, and the Tribunal found that the importance of
76. Compare Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, Art. II, reported in 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 702, 703 (1972) with Interna-
tional Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, Art. V, 9
INT'L LEG. MAT'S 45, 48-51 (1970). The former imposes strict liability for accidents occur-
ring on the earth. In the latter, the amount to which a ship owner can be held strictly
liable is limited under a funding arrangement.
77. Helsinki Rules, Art. XI.
78. Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Spain v. France), 12 U.N.R.I.A.A. 281 (1957), 53 AM.
J. INT'L L. 156 (1959).
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economic development outweighed potential effects. The Trail
Smelter Tribunal adopted the same protective attitude toward
economic development. Rather than cause Canada economic det-
riment by forcing the smelter to cease operations, the Tribunal
created a commission and a system of indemnification in the
event of future harm. Canada, as a developed country, could well
afford to pay the indemnification sums.
D. New Helios' uses of the shared waterways are entitled to no
inherent preference as prior uses.
Article VI of the Helsinki Rules states: "A use or category of
uses is not entitled to any inherent preference over any other use
or category of uses." Nor does a survey of treaty law support the
view that prior uses are entitled to absolute protection. Under
international law, the degree of protection, if any, varies from
case to case. As one commentator observed: "Many, if not most,
treaties make no mention of protection of existing uses. Among
those that do, uniformity is lacking." 9 Although navigational
uses were once accorded preferences, recent treaty law offers little
help as to what uses would be accorded preference since they deal
generally with the treatment of a single use.8
Any pre-existing use of shared waterways by New Helios is
of little import. International law does not allow a preceding use
by an industrially advanced state such as New Helios to preclude
any subsequent equitable use of the same waters by a developing
state such as Karma.
II. Karma's status as a developing nation entitles it to
preferential treatment.
The needs of developing states have long been recognized in
the practice of nation states and international organizations. In
the preamble to its Charter, the United Nations pledges itself to
"the economic and social advancement of all peoples." Under
Article 55 of the Charter, it is stated that "the United Nations
shall promote . . . higher standards of living, full employment,
and conditions of economic and social progress and develop-
ment." Understandably, a greater promotional effort will be nec-
79. Lipper, Equitable Utilization, TIE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS 51 (A.
Garretson, R. Hayton & C. Olmstead eds. 1967) [hereinafter cited as Lipper].
80. Lipper at 87.
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essary in developing than in developed countries. These are the
very goals which Karma now seeks for its people.
Such goals were recently approved by the world community.
The 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment was
convened by the United Nations out of "[c]oncern about the
consequent effects on the condition of man, his physical, mental
and social well-being, his dignity and his enjoyment of basic
human rights, in developing as well as developed countries."'
The preamble of the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Envi-
ronment stressed the equitable solution of pollution problems and
the application of special considerations in regard to developing
countries. The achievement of environmental goals
will demand the acceptance of responsibility by citizens and
communities and by enterprises and institutions at every level,
all sharing equitably in common efforts .... Local and na-
tional governments will bear the greatest burden for large-scale
environmental policy and action within their jurisdictions. In-
ternational cooperation is also needed in order to raise resources
to support the developing countries in carrying out their respon-
sibilities in this field.82
The Stockholm Declaration states that
it will be essential in all cases to consider the systems of values
prevailing in each country, and the extent of the applicability
of standards which are valid for the most advanced countries
but which may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost
for the developing countries.3
The Stockholm Conference evidenced a clear and unambi-
guous concern for the problems of developing states in global
efforts to minimize environmental harm. The Stockholm Recom-
mendations enumerated a number of specific concerns." Perhaps
the most relevant to the situation between Karma and New He-
lios is the concern that the preoccupation of developed countries
with their own environmental problems "should not affect the
flow of assistance to undeveloped countries and should include
81. G.A. Res. 2398 (XXIII) (1968).
82. Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declara-
tion on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Stockholm Declaration].
83. Stockholm Declaration, Principle 23.
84. Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Recom-
mendations on Development and Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Recommendations on Development and Environment].
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money for environmental aid."85 Nations were admonished to rec-
ognize "that the burdens of the environmental policies of the
industrialized countries should not be transferred, either directly
or indirectly, to the developing countries."86 If there are negative
effects on exports, particularly from developing countries, appro-
priate measures of compensation should be devised.
Assistance in meeting the consequences of stricter environmen-
tal standards ought to be given in the form of financial or techni-
cal assistance for research with a view to removing the obstacles
that the products of developing countries have encountered7
Regional organizations were asked to pay particular heed to the
"special problems of the least developed countries." ' The Confer-
ence's continued concern with these problems was evidenced by
its recommendation that "[a] study must be made to determine
how environmental protection may be made available to undevel-
oped countries without resulting in an 'unacceptable burden' to
them."89 The Stockholm Conference and Recommendations bear
directly upon the present controversy. The special difficulties
Karma faces in its economic development mitigate any responsi-
bilities it might otherwise have to New Helios. New Helios has
failed to recognize that its environmental burdens cannot be
transferred to a developing state such as Karma.
The Helsinki Rules are in accord. One factor to be considered
in determining the equitable share of a drainage basin is "the
economic and social needs of each basin State."9 Karma, as a
developing country, has pressing economic and social needs and
the necessity of Karma's industrialization far outweighs the
minor consequences to New Helios. The alternative means of
satisfying Karma's needs, such as the installation of costly pollu-
tion control devices, are prohibitive in light of Karma's economic
situation."
As a developed, industrialized nation enjoying a high stan-
dard of living, New Helios in all probability has and continues to
pollute. "Available data show that the level of economic activity
is a close correlate of national pollution emission rates. Generally
85. Recommendations on Development and Environment, Rec. 109.
86. Recommendations on Development and Environment, Rec. 103.
87. Id.
88. Recommendations on Development and Environment, Rec. 102.
89. Recommendations on Development and Environment, Rec. 108.
90. Helsinki Rules, Art. V(e).
91. Helsinki Rules, Art. V(g).
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speaking, developed states are polluter states, while developing
states are non-polluter states."92 As a developed state, New Helios
is, by definition, a polluter state. New Helios could not have
achieved its present status in the world community without
having taken advantage of years of rampant industrialization
with free access to the air and water environment. "[P]ollution
potential increases as the standard of living increases. Thus, the
developed world with a higher standard of living contributes pro-
portionately more to worldwide pollution."93 New Helios, a pollu-
ter, cannot ask this court to enjoin the relatively minimal pollu-
tion produced by Karma, not in an effort to achieve a high stan-
dard of living but merely to maintain subsistence level for its
people.
Where two parties have assumed an identical or a reciprocal
obligation, one party which is engaged in a continuing non-
performance of that obligation should not be permitted to take
advantage of a similar non-performance of that obligation by
the other party.
As a developed state New Helios has polluted and, therefore, has
no right to complain of Karma's actions. In the River Meuse,5 the
Court refused to enjoin Belgium's construction of a canal because
of the Netherlands' prior operation of a canal in the same waters.
Applying principles of equity, the Court stated that even though
"the Belgian action with regard to the functioning of the Neer-
haren Lock is contrary to the Treaty of 1863, it should neverthe-
less refuse in this case to order Belgium to discontinue that
action."96 Assuming arguendo that Karma's actions were in viola-
tion of the 1923 Treaty, there would still be no basis for holding
Karma liable because New Helios has continuously polluted.
The fears of developing nations in regard to the imposition
of stringent international environmental standards by developed
nations were acknowledged by a panel of experts which met in
preparation for the Stockholm Conference.17 Some of those fears
92. Hull & Koers, A Regime for World Ocean Pollution Control, INTERNATIONAL RELA-
TIONS AND THEFUTURE OF OCEAN SPACE 98 (R. Wirsing ed. 1974).
93. Knauss at 319.
94. The Diversion of Water from the River Meuse (Netherlands v. Belgium), [1937]
P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 70, 77 [hereinafter cited as River Meuse].
95. Id.
96. River Meuse at 78.
97. REPORT OF A PANEL OF EXPERTs CONVENED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE U.N.
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which a country in Karma's economic position may reasonably
hold include:
fear that the developed nations will create rigorous standards for
products traded internationally and generate a "neo-protec-
tionism" excluding nonconforming goods from poor lands;...
fear that developed lands will unilaterally dictate environmen-
tal standards to the developing lands without considering how
to relate those standards to the conditions of the developing
lands; . . . fear that the developed states will saddle the devel-
oping with their own definition of what are proper global envi-
ronmental concerns.98
If Karma were forced to pay for the insubstantial injury caused
to New Helios by pollution from the pulp and paper mill and the
nuclear plant, such a judicial decision would only confirm the
worst fears of developing nations and have grave implications in
the world community. The powerful, industrialized nations must
admit their heavy responsibility for world pollution and show a
good faith willingness to bear their financial burden of eliminat-
ing pollution. A just decision in favor of Karma will aid interna-
tional stability.
Karma would not dispute the acceptance of sic utere and
droit de voisinage as rules of international customary law. The
world grows smaller with the advance of technology and national
isolation is a luxury no longer feasible or desirable. Each nation
has special responsibilities to neighboring countries, to all other
countries individually, and to the world at large. Only in an at-
mosphere of cooperation will the countries of the world achieve
lasting peace and uniformly high standards of living.
III. Karma has performed all of its obligations under the 1923
Treaty of Amity, Friendship and Economic Cooperation as
required by international law.
The validity of the 1923 Treaty of Amity, Friendship and
Economic Cooperation, as well as its binding force, is not dis-
puted. Karma disputes the strained application of this half-
century-old treaty to its contemporary quest for industrial devel-
opment. The 1923 Treaty speaks of the obligation not to pollute
CONFERENCE ON THE HumAN ENVIRONMENT, June 4-12, 1971, Founex, Switzerland, Annex
1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/10.
98. Robinson, Problems of Definition and Scope, LAw, INsTiTnONS AND THE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT 49 (J. Hargrove ed. 1972) summarizing the Founex Report.
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shared waterways, but this provision must be regarded in its pro-
per context. Due to the broad nature of the treaty in question, as
well as the legal, technological, economic and political events
which have transpired in the last fifty years, this treaty must be
regarded in its entirety and in a new light. It is a cardinal rule of
the international law governing the interpretation of treaties that
the
[w]hole of the treaty must be taken into consideration if the
meaning of any one of its provisions is doubtful and not only the
wording of the treaty but also its purpose, the motives which led
to its conclusion and the conditions prevailing at that time."
In the instant controversy, the 1923 Treaty's prohibition of
pollution does not proscribe Karma's activities for three reasons.
Firstly, what actually constitutes pollution under the 1923 Treaty
is not clear. The Treaty itself does not specify standards, and
existing treaties regulating pollution fail to clarify that ambigu-
ity.'0 It is also clear that existing standards of international law
tolerate a limited amount of contamination. 10'
Secondly, most of the older conventions prohibiting water
pollution were designed to safeguard fishing.'0 It is likely that the
provision regarding pollution in the 1923 Treaty was adopted to
protect fish stocks and not as a general prohibition against waste.
There is no evidence of any current harm to fish stocks of the
waterways shared with New Helios.
Thirdly, paragraph 2 of Article II of the 1923 Treaty strongly
suggests that even the drafters of the agreement recognized that
paragraph 1 was too general to be considered a proscription. It is
advised therein that the parties enact specific arrangements to
control the application of paragraph 1. That no such action has
been undertaken is indicative of lack of agreement on the scope
of this provision. Moreover, New Helios' failure to officially pro-
test the use of the shared waterways for waste disposal for nearly
twenty years provides implicit consent to this use by Karma.
99. 1 H. LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 953 (8th ed. 1955). See also
A. McNAIR, LAW OF TREATI 424 (1961).
100. See, e.g., Manner, Water Pollution in International Law, 2 UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON WATER POLLUTION PROBLEMS IN EUROPE, DocUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE
CONFERENCE, 450-53 (1961), cited in WHTEMAN, 3 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1044 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Manner]; Lester, Pollution, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL DRAINAGE
BASINS 103 (A. Garretson, R. Hayton & C. Olmstead eds. 1967).
101. See Brownlie, A Survey of International Customary Rules of Environmentai
Protection, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 2 (L. Teclaff & A. Utton eds. 1974).
102. See Manner at 450.
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Assuming arguendo that the 1923 Treaty did proscribe
Karma's use of shared waterways for waste disposal and for cool-
ing its nuclear power plant, the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus
should apply and relieve Karma of such extended obligations
under the Treaty. Circumstances have radically changed since
1923. The Treaty, like many treaties of that era, was primarily
concerned with preserving navigational uses. 103 This concern is
evidenced in Article III of the 1923 Treaty, which deals with free-
dom of navigation.
Substantially changed circumstances are also evidenced by
the fact that Karma did not know of the economic value of its
Wilderness Region until 1955. The technologies of contemporary
paper mills and of nuclear energy plants were in all probability
unknown to either party at the time they entered into the 1923
Treaty. Since an essential basis of that agreement has been radi-
cally modified by intervening events not prompted by Karma, a
fundamental change of circumstances is present and should
relieve Karma of any liability.'04
In its title and in a number of provisions, the Treaty calls for
economic cooperation. As a developing state, Karma's economic
advances have required much sacrifice and hard work. The record
of New Helios, the industrially advanced party to this Treaty, in
furthering that economic growth has been disappointing. New
Helios chooses to ignore that economic cooperation is a part of the
1923 Treaty. This is especially true in this controversy, in which
New Helios seeks to have Karma bear the additional burden of
safeguarding the economic well-being of New Helios' industries.
The cost of economic growth should not be so compounded, par-
ticularly when the 1923 Treaty calls for economic cooperation. In
order to protect economic growth, the world community has been
willing to impose different standards of care on developing and
developed nations. 105 The 1923 Treaty, which calls for economic
cooperation, must encompass such considerations.
103. See BARROS at 16; Manner at 450; cf. Convention and Statute on the Regime of
Navigable Waterways of International Concern, Apr. 20, 1921, 7 L.N.T.S. 35.
104. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Art. 62, Doe.
A/CONF.39/27. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 153 (1965).
105. See, e.g., The Stockholm Declaration, which rates in pertinent part:
it will be essential in all cases to consider. . . the extent of the applicability of
standards which are valid for the most advanced countries but which may be
inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for the developing countries.
Stockholm Declaration, Principle 23.
[Vol. I:I1
INT'L DRAINAGE BASINS
IV. New Helios is not entitled to monetary or injuctive relief.
Recent statements of international customary law show a
clear recognition of the responsibility which developed countries
have toward developing countries in view of the heavy economic
burdens of development. The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade allows developing nation members to deviate temporarily
from the rules applicable to other trading parties."°6 Under the
Stockholm Declaration,
[s]tates shall cooperate to develop further the international law
regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution
and other environmental damage caused by activities within the
jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond their juris-
diction.'0 7
This principle, in conjunction with the previously cited provisions
of Stockholm principles and declarations, implicitly requires
states to develop a law of liability and compensation which takes
into account the needs of developing states. The cost of pollution
control is prohibitive for a country of Karma's economic status.
Bearing in mind the absence of clearly defined principles of liabil-
ity and the insistence of the Stockholm Declaration that develop-
ing countries be given special consideration, this Court should be
reluctant to impose a monetary judgment upon Karma.
Even if Karma were to be held liable in damages by this
Tribunal, no amounts should be awarded for violation of sover-
eignty. In the Corfu Channel case, minesweeping was held to be
a violation but "this declaration by the Court constitutes in itself
appropriate satisfaction."'0 8 In addition, Karma should not be
required to compensate New Helios for its costs because the gen-
eral rule is that each country bears its own.' °9 It would, in fact,
be equitable for New Helios to pay Karma's costs in this consen-
sual arbitration.
New Helios is not entitled to injunctive relief. The Stock-
holm Conference looked to compensation only, and not injunc-
tions. Trail Smelter serves only to clarify when liability attaches,
but limits injunctive relief. In that arbitration, the duty of a
developed country to indemnify and regulate polluting uses was
106. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, Art. XVIII, 61 Stat. (5),
(6), T.I.A.S. 1700; 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 252.
107. Stockholm Declaration, Principle 22.
108. Corfu Channel, [1949] I.C.J. 4.
109. I.C.J. STAT., art. 64; I.C.J. RuLEs, art. 76.
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stated, but economic growth was safeguarded and the smelter
allowed to continue its operations. An injunction is even less ap-
propriate when a developed state seeks relief from a developing
nation. Furthermore, in the Lake Lanoux arbitration it was deter-
mined that an injunction was not available for potential harm.
New Helios is not entitled to an injunction against the pulp mill
or the full operation of the nuclear power plant. New Helios is not
harmed by having to spend minimal amounts to correct any ad-
verse effects of Karma's program of industrialization.
A solution to the instant controversy would be the creation
of a special commission to regulate use of shared waters under the
doctrine of equitable utilization. Many publicists, emphasizing
the variable characteristics of each drainage basin, have found
separate commissions to be a necessity."' While New Helios
should bear the present expense of water pollution control,
Karma would cooperate in an overall effort to govern the drainage
basin. Cooperation would be beneficial to both Karma and New
Helios in various ways, including the exchange of scientific infor-
mation and the use of monitoring systems."' The nuclear plant
is in a location which could potentially be shared with New
Helios, and there are many other beneficial uses relating to cool-
ing waters which could be adopted to mutual advantage if the
necessary funding were available." 2 In the absence of an estab-
lished basin commission, this Court should not demand more of
Karma than international law exacts.
CONCLUSION
Because Karma's uses of the Upper and Lower Peace Rivers
and International Lake are not substantially injurious to New
Helios, Karma's actions are not violative of international law or
of the 1923 Treaty of Amity, Friendship and Economic Coopera-
tion. New Helios has no valid claim of relief.
Susan Alexander
Dale Christensen, Jr.
Ellen Frances Schulman
110. See, e.g., Laylin & Bianchi, The Role of Adjudication in International River
Disputes: the Lake Lanoux Case, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 30 (1959).
111. See O.E.C.D., Recommendation of the Council on Principles Concerning Trans.
frontier Pollution, C(74)224 (21st Nov. 1974), Title E.
112. See Maloney, More Heat than Light: Thermal Pollution versus Heat Energy
Utilization, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 693, 713-14 (1973).
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